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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
This project was conducted for maintenance and operation process and its effects on 
Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety of Diesel Locomotive System. 
The focus is on Diesel Locomotive that has a model and analysis study was carried 
out to examine the current performance based on RAMS for Keretapi Tanah Melayu 
Berhad (KTMB). This Project presented a study for the risk assessment of Diesel 
Locomotive System using the operation data collected from the railway industry. The 
proposed assessment method of railway risks was demonstrated and the investigation 
on the RAMS performance of the Diesel Locomotive and their major failure causes 
was done. Reliability of the system in this thesis was analysed in qualitative and 
quantitative methods. The effective parameters on the reliability of the Diesel 
Locomotive System, FMEA, FTA and its application were done qualitatively. In 
achieving the aims of the project, the events and incident which could be generated 
by the system failure were defined to determine the consequences of the realized 
incidents. In this step two categories were taken into account including operation and 
system component. Then, the next phase was concentrated on considering and 
analysing the relevant processes and the root causes which result in the identified 
failure. After all probable root causes were clarified, then the root causes identified 
and necessary preventive actions were taken. The aim of this step was either 
decreasing the occurrence of root causes or increasing the detectability of failure. In 
the last part quantitative method has been used to measure the amounts of Reliability, 
Availability and Maintainability of the system, based on MTBF and MTTR of 
different components of the system and the solutions to improve system reliability 
based on components FTA model was introduced. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
 
 
Projek ini dijalankan bertujuan untuk menentukan penyelenggaraan dan proses 
operasi sistem Diesel Lokomotif dengan Menggunakakan kaedah Kebolehpercayaan, 
Ketersediaan , penyelenggaraan dan Keselamatan (RAMS) . Model Lokomotif 
Diesel Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad (KTMB) telah dipilih untuk dianalisis. Projek 
ini berpandukan kajian penilaian risiko Lokomotif Diesel dengan menggunakan data 
operasi Lokomotif yang dikumpul daripada industri kereta api bagi mengaplikasikan 
kaedah penilaian risiko kepada operasi keretapi dan mengenalpasti prestasi RAMS 
bagi Lokomotif Diesel dan sebab-sebab kegagalan utama sistem tersebut. 
Kebolehpercayaan sistem dalam projek ini telah dianalisis dalam kaedah kualitatif 
dan kuantitatif. Dalam kaedah kualitatif adalah berpandukan parameter RAMS pada 
kebolehpercayaan sistem Lokomotif Diesel secara kaedah FMEA dan FTA. Untuk 
mencapai proses terebut,  sebab-sebab dan kejadian utama kegagalan sistem 
Lokomotif Diesel telah ditentukan berdasarkan kejadian daripada insiden. Dalam 
proses ini dua kategori diambil aspek utama telah diambil kira iaitu operasi 
lokomotif dan komponen sistem lokomotif. Fasa seterusnya tertumpu kepada 
pertimbangan dan menganalisis proses-proses yang berkaitan kepada punca yang 
menyebabkan kegagalan yang telah dikenal pasti. Setelah itu semua punca kegagalan 
ia terjadi kepada sistem utama telah dikenal pasti maka tindakan-tindakan 
pencegahan yang diperlukan dapat ditentukan. Tujuan langkah ini adalah sama ada 
mengurangkan berlakunya punca kegagalan atau meningkatkan pengesanan 
kegagalan. Dalam bahagian terakhir projek ini adalah kaedah kuantitatif telah 
digunakan untuk mengukur jumlah Kebolehpercayaan, Ketersediaan dan 
penyelenggaraan sistem, berdasarkan MTBF dan MTTR komponen yang berbeza 
pada setiap sistem dan penyelesaian untuk meningkatkan kebolehpercayaan kepada 
sistem berdasarkan komponen model FTA. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Project Background 
 
 
Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad (KTMB) is a private limited company, incorporated 
and domiciled in Malaysia. The company is wholly owned by the Minister of 
Finance Incorporated, a corporate body established in Malaysia. The principle 
activities of KTMB are to operate the railway transportation and the provision of 
related railway services in Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore. The company 
operates these activities pursuant to a license issued by the Minister of Transport. 
KTMB has always been the nation’s established player in the logistic 
industry, moving passengers, goods and services throughout the railway network in 
Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore. Its rail network strategically links and helps to 
develop the industrial growth centres in the inland to the seaports such as Penang 
Port, Port Klang, Port of Tanjung Pelepas and Tanjung Pagar. It also connects cross 
border movements of freight between Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand (Angelalia 
Roza 2013). 
Encik Mohd. Salleh Abdullah, The Managing Director of KTMB remarked, 
KTMB continues to focus on providing safe, efficient and reliable integrated rail 
services with greatly improved services for both passengers and goods. KTMB is 
committed to becoming a respected and significant total land transport solution 
services provider. Therefore, a good rail transport system has to be developed in 
Malaysia to keep up with the demands and the rapid development as a developing 
country. To upgrade the national rail system, current performance of rail system must 
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be assessed beforehand. When the current level of performance is identified, it is 
easier to chart the development of the railway system in the country. 
 In the latest Malaysia Plan, the Government has indicated its intention to 
develop rail transport to play a larger role in both inter-city and urban transport. The 
main intercity rail line of KTMB, from Johor Bahru in the south to Padang Besar on 
the Thai border in the north, is now being double-tracked and electrified. Double 
track system is built to increase the capacity of train by added the new commuters 
train technology trends set which is Electrical Multiple Unit (EMU) to replace the 
trend Diesel Multiple Unit (DMU) as a main passenger transport while the DMU 
used to transport goods including cargo, cement, sugar and other.  Dual Track system 
is built on the original route by adding another track to the existing track. Double-
track railway between Ipoh and Klang Valley is designed to allow trains to passes 
through at speeds of up to 160 km / h and this will introduce a rapid train service 
with 16 trips per day or until a maximum of 32 trips per day. In addition, it can 
reduce travel time and increase the frequency of trains schedule between towns and 
cities. With this can help countries improve rail infrastructure in line with the 
government's objective to achieve a vision towards 2020 (Sarah et al. 2012). 
Malaysian railways are facing a challenge to improve their reliability and 
speed in order to offer competitive services to the public and enhance their 
importance as a road alternative. Considering these situations, it is required to 
establish an evaluation method which applicable in designing railways system that 
has an excellent RAMS performance.  RAMS is an acronym for the four assessment 
indicators which are reliability, availability, maintainability and safety. This RAMS 
was the required for train operation in order to maintain the good balance by 
considering those indicators and system efficiency. It also increases the service 
performance when it applied in train operation. 
 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
 
RAMS of a railway system affects the system during operation (operating 
conditions) and the system during maintenance activities (maintenance conditions). 
To comprehend the dependable system, factors which can affect the RAMS of the 
system need to be identified, as they can also affect the life cycle of the system. 
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Reliability and safety of railway operating system are among the crucial aspects in 
any organization since they have direct implication on the performance and 
productivity of an organization. 
In this project, we consider the problem arises in the train operation system 
that will disturb the train operation. For KTMB that runs multiple train units in rail 
network, predicting and keeping a required level of train operation availability is a 
challenging task. The stochastic nature of train breakdowns and the corrective 
maintenance to fix them are problems to keep track of availability of the train 
operation. If more trains are withdrawn from an operation due to failure, the train 
operator cannot provide the required transportation capacity to cover the scheduled 
services. To enhance the availability of the operation, the management needs to keep 
reliability of trains.  
Each day KTMB keeps 16 trains operation between Ipoh to KL central for 
demand the customer satisfaction. Standby trains are spare trains available in case of 
one of the operational trains fail. However keeping a high number of spare trains is 
very costly and it is not economical. The challenge of this situation is how the 
RAMS to be analysis for the long run train availability in order to keep the 
serviceability to the passenger satisfy (Sarah et al. 2012). 
 
 
1.3 Objective 
 
 
The objectives of this project are: 
 
i. To evaluate the reliability of locomotive system reliability performance. 
ii. To determine the effect of availability and maintainability of train operation 
using RAMS analysis. 
 
 
1.4 Scope of Study 
 
 
The scopes of this project are: 
 
i. The Locomotive Class 24 includes passengers and freight train operation. 
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ii. Only Diesel Locomotive System to be study based on the failure of the 
system. 
 
 
1.5 Significant Of Study 
 
 
The purpose of this research is to analysis the existing of train operation by included 
RAMS into available railway systems to achieve the succeed performance, such as 
reliability, availability and maintainability. The methodology and the model that has 
been developed will determine the RAMS performance which helping the railway 
system to establish their functions and activities. 
The significant of this study is to evaluate the reliability of critical system that 
forms part of the Diesel Locomotive within Malaysia Railways industry. Other than 
that, it is to identify and analyse the potential cause of the failures. Therefore, the 
project should be able to evaluate the reliability performance of the critical system of 
the diesel locomotive at KTMB and to determine the highest failure rate that 
contributes to loss of operation and the reliability performance targets. 
In the previous project, Tomo state that to reduce equipment failure and 
increase their availability and maintainability, it is important that RAMS engineering 
and maintenance management understand the concept of RAMS. The goal of this 
study is to find the best concept of RAMS engineering as to provide guidelines on 
how these concept can be implemented to improve the RAMS of diesel locomotive. 
This project constitutes for KTMB organization dealing with the RAMS for 
maintenance strategy in order to improve the reliability, availability and 
maintainability of train operation. 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
The Malaysian railways are indeed a dynamic, diverse corporatized entity that has 
the potential to play an important role in the development of a sustainable 
transportation system in the country. In year 2020 the rail transport systems must be 
developed to keep up with demand and the rapid development. Malaysian railways 
are facing the challenge to improve their reliability and speed in order to offer 
competitive services and enhance their importance as a road alternative (Donavan 
2004). 
KTMB operates a mixed network of railway system that is used for tranport 
both passengers and goods. Due to the ubiquity of single line tracks throughout the 
network, there is some competition between freight and passenger rail for line time. 
The shortage of resources for locomotives and crews, the low average train speeds 
(60 kph), narrow 1 meter track gauge and old rolling stock have become the 
constraints in rail transport (Abdul et al., 2008). These constraints have resulted in 
longer travel times on certain routes. However, the railway sector is striving to 
increase its capacity to meet the growing demand for the transport of goods and 
passengers with a high level of punctuality in its services. Now, the railway Efforts 
to make a double track network are underway (in 2003) in the hopes of alleviating 
some of these problems. 
Railway service over 100 years old has gone through many changes. Starting 
with coal locomotives, diesel engines and diesel power, to our commuter service 
using electricity was first introduced in 1995. KTMB control 1791 km length, 1000 
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mm gauge railway network, 1655 km in Peninsular Malaysia (Mahadzir, 2007). It 
consists of two main lines which are West coast line and East coast line and several 
branch lines. Now, KTM offers four types of services include KTM Intercity, KTM 
Cargo, KTM Commuter and KTM Distribution.  
 In this project are generally to study the KTM Intercity and good, therefore to 
some extent on matters concerning the KTM Intercity and good will be described. 
Intercity train service is a service that was introduced by KTM since more than a 
decade ago. As introduce additional services to the people by giving them choice in 
terms of diversity coach and travel destinations includes Peninsular Malaysia. 
Change for change has been implemented to provide services in a comfortable and 
safe journey to your destination of choice in the shortest time possible. Most of these 
services operate from Station Kuala Lumpur Sentral. However, there is a train 
service runs along the East Coast route and Gemas and next heading to Singapore. 
There is a cross-border rail services operating between Butterworth and Bangkok, 
Thailand. 
 
 
2.2 RAMS Parameters 
 
 
RAMS is a characteristic of a system’s long term operation and is achieved by the 
application of established engineering concepts, methods, tools and techniques. 
RAMS of the system can be defined as qualitative and quantitative indexes which are 
related to the system, subsystem or the grade of component parts of the system can 
be relied upon to function as specified and to be both available and safe. RAMS is 
used as an available tool to understand how the whole system functions such as train 
operation on a track. There also used to predict the imperfections and showing the 
influence the quality and performance of the system. It also used the method to 
improve the quality of the operation for an optimum long term behavior and 
choosing the best maintenance strategies. Railway on vehicle transport system is a 
mission and safety critical system. Therefore, to achieve the safety operational of a 
railway system, all possible potential hazards that affect the system component must 
be identified, assessed and controlled through RAMS to achieve of safety and 
reliability (Tzanakakis et al., 2013).  
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According to Ali Ebrahimi in the previous research was implement the 
reliability analysis based on qualitative and quantitative methods. Their used of 
RAMS in analysis of analysis of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety 
(RAMS ) Parameters in design and operation of Dynamic Positioning (DP) systems 
in floating offshore structures. In qualitative method to find the effective parameters 
on the reliability of the DP system, Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) and its 
application as a main tool have been used. In the part of quantitative method has 
been used to measure the amounts of Reliability, Availability and Maintainability of 
the system, based on MTBF and MTTR of different components of the system (Ali 
Ebrahimi 2010). The description and definition is according to Melkamu Teshome as 
following. 
Reliability is defined as probability that an item can perform a required 
function under given conditions for a given time interval.  
Availability is defined as ability of a product to be in a state to perform a 
required function under given conditions at a given instant of time or over a given 
time interval assuming that the required external recourses are provided  
Maintainability is defined as probability that a given active maintenance 
action, for an item under given conditions of use can be carried out within a stated 
time interval when the maintenance is performed under stated conditions and using 
stated procedures and resource.  
Safety is defined as the state of technical system freedom from unacceptable 
risk of harm.  
 
 
2.2.1 Reliability Parameters 
 
 
Reliability is measured by the probability that a system or component will work 
without failure during a specified time interval, with consideration of given operating 
conditions and environment (Tzanakakis, 2013). The failure categories of system or 
component of work can explain in table 2.1. To determine the performance that 
required of the track system, the failure modes of the train should be identified and 
categorised as the failure categories illustrated in the table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1: RAM failure categories (EN 50126, 1999) 
 
Failure Category Definition 
Significant 
(Immobilizing Failure) 
A failure That 
- Prevent train movement or causes a delay to service 
greater than specified time and/or generates a cost 
greater than a specified level 
Major (Service Failure) 
A failure that 
- Must be rectifier for the system to achieve its specified 
performance and 
- Does not cause a delay or cost greater than the 
minimum threshold specified for a significant failure 
Minor 
A failure that 
- Does not prevent a system achieving its specified 
performance and 
- Does not meet criteria for significant or major failure  
 
Higher reliability targets placed on a significant failure while the small 
failures target is place in the small failures category. Therefore, the infrastructure 
manager must know which failure mode of the train needs to be given more attention 
in order to achieve the reliability of both systems and incur less cost because of 
failure. Among the factors which have an important influence on the equipment 
reliability are period of use and environment of use. The Typical reliability 
parameters that have been used for track show in table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Typical reliability parameters that have been used for track (Tzanakakis, 
2013). 
No. Reliability Parameter Description 
1 Mean Time To Failure (MTTF)  for non-repairable system 
2 Mean Distance To Failure (MDTF) for non-repairable system 
3 Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) for repairable system 
4 Mean Distance Between Failure (MDBF) for repairable system 
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The rate of failure is often described as the Mean Time Between Failure 
(MTBF) which determines the time for the average period between failure. For part 
of non-repaired with constant failure rate, reliability is given by: 
 
 







 timeoperating Total
failure ofNumber 
R  (2.1) 
 
If failures occur randomly then they can be described by an exponential distribution  
  MTBF
t
λt eetR

   (2.2) 
Where;    λ = Failure rate (
MTBF
1
  λ  ) 
Probability of Failure; The general expression for probability of failure F(t) is given 
by 
   tR - 1  tF   (2.3) 
 
Reliability is obtained from failure rate, as described above.  Failure rate is 
the time rate of change of the probability of failure. Failure rate is a function of time 
and often obtain some indication as to which of the influencing factors is controlling 
and at what time it is controlling. For this to happen, failures must be recorded. In 
most databases today, failure data sets are scarce or they have a short background. 
The whole process is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Fig. 2.1:  Reliability and failure rate forecasting procedures (Tzanakakis, 2013). 
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2.2.2 Availability Parameters 
 
Reliability and maintenance to strongly related to the availability of systems 
and equipment. Reliable system requires less maintenance and good maintainability 
in shorten repair time. A system has different operational phases: The description and 
definition is according to Tzanakakis. 
 
 Uptime (Up) : the time that a system works 
 Downtime (Down) : the system does not work 
 
Availability is a function of uptime and downtime as shown the following Figure 2.2 
and equation (2.4) 
 
DowntimeUptime
Uptime
 timeTotal
Uptime
 ty Availabili

  (2.4) 
 
 
Fig. 2.2:  System Operational States (Tzanakakis, 2013). 
 
System availability can be determined in three ways such as: 
 
i. Inherent availability 
ii. Achieved availability 
iii. Operational availability 
 
Inherent availability there is appropriate circumstances to analysis the 
availability. Inherent availability is the probability that a system or equipment when 
used under specified conditions which will operate properly at any time as required 
(Tzanakakis, 2013). Inherent availability is based on an ideal support environment, 
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which assumes that tools, spare parts and personnel are readily available. Inherent 
availability for example only takes corrective maintenance into account: 
MTTR  MTBF
MTBF
 ty availabiliInherent 

  (2.5) 
 
Where; MTBF  - Mean Time Between failure 
  MTTR - Mean Time To Repair 
 
Achieved availability is based on the fact that the system that requires 
maintenance and consider preventive and corrective Maintenance. Achieved 
availability is also based on an ideal support environment but with consideration of 
preventive maintenance or schedule (Tzanakakis, 2013). 
 
MDT  MTBM
MTBM
 ty availabili Achieved

  (2.6) 
 
 Where; MTBM - Mean Time Between Maintenance 
   MAMT - Mean Active Maintenance Time 
 
Operations availability is the probability of system or equipment including 
preventive and corrective maintenance, logistics delay time and delay time of 
administration. It shows the availability of the actual operating environment 
(Tzanakakis, 2013). 
MDT  MTBM
MTBM
 ty availabili lOperationa

  (2.7) 
 
 Where; MTBM - Mean Time Between Maintenance 
   MDT -  Mean Down Time 
 
Increase in preventive maintenance or renewal actions can have an adverse 
effect on the availability of the system as it reduces MTBM or MDBM. But at the 
same time it increases the MTBF/ MDBF of the system. So optimisation of the 
number of preventive maintenance actions is necessary in order to achieve 
availability of the system. 
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Mean Down Time (MDT) comprises of Mean Detection Time 
(troubleshooting time), Mean Decision time (time to take decision in case of a 
failure), MTTR, Mean Functional Test time (testing for startup time) and Mean 
Logistic Time. The availability of a track is for example 98,5%. This means that the 
track should be operational 360 days of 365 days per year (=365 X 98,5%). 
 
2.2.3 Maintainability Parameters 
 
 
Maintainability design is related to the function and must be current Engineering 
design phase, definition, and the early development of life cycle. Maintainability 
Engineering done for the following reasons: 
 
i. To achieve ease of maintenance through design, reducing maintenance 
time and cost 
ii. To estimate maintenance and system downtime 
iii. To estimate labour, hours, time, and other resources for proper 
maintenance 
 
Maintainability is usually measured by mean time to repair (MTTR). The 
elements contained in the MTTR given by the time access and repair/replacement 
time. Maintainability is also represented by the mean time between maintenance 
(MTBM) or mean distance between maintenance (MDBM). Maintainability is 
calculated with the mean time to repair (MTTR), which represents the downtime 
because of maintenance done (Tzanakakis, 2013). 
 
MTTR
t
t ee

  11Ms

  (2.8) 
Where;  μ is repair (restoration) rate (μ = 1 / MTTR) 
 
 
2.2.4 Safety Parameters 
 
 
Safety analysis is relating to the categories and levels of hazardous events that can 
happen to a track or train system. Hazard identification must consider early phase in 
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the safety analysis. The hazardous events should be categorized as frequent, 
probable, occasional, remote, improbable and incredible. Likewise severity level can 
be divided into four categories namely catastrophic, critical, marginal and 
insignificant. 
Safety can be defined as a subset of reliability with consideration of the 
severity of the failure mode. Typical safety parameters that have been used to track 
or train scenario as the following: 
i. Mean Time Between Hazardous Failure (MTBHF) 
ii. Mean Time Between Safety System Failure (MTBSF) 
iii. Hazard rate H(t) 
Time units in the above cases are considered in Million Gross Tonnes (MGT). 
 
 
2.2.5 Summaries of term RAMS Values for System Operational States 
 
 
Table 2.3:  The key values for system operational state (Tzanakakis, 2013). 
Reliability 
MTBF        
 
Mean Time Between Failure (for corrective 
maintenance) 
MTBM  
 
 
Mean Time Between Maintenance for preventive 
Maintenance 
MTBF and MTTF: Often used to describe equipment 
or system reliability. Of use when calculating 
maintenance costs. Meaningful even if the failure rate 
is not constant. 
Train delaying failures 
Availability Train delay hours 
maintainability 
MTTR  
 
Mean Time to Repair 
Often expressed in percentile terms such as “the 95% 
repair time shall be 1 hour”. This means that only 5% 
of the repair actions shall exceed 1 hour. 
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Table 2.3: (continued) 
 MDT   
 
Mean Down Time  
In organizational management, mean down time 
(MDT) is the average time that a system is 
nonoperational. This includes all time associated with 
• repair, corrective and preventive maintenance, 
• self-imposed downtime, and 
• any logistics or administrative delays. 
The inclusion of delay times distinguishes mean down 
time from mean time to repair (MTTR), which includes 
only downtime specifically attributable to repairs. 
 NAMT Mean Active Maintenance Time 
MMH Mean Maintenance Hour (MMH) 
Safety 
Hazard Rate 
Number of derailment due to asset 
Number of accidents 
 
 
2.3 Methods and Tools for RAMS Analysis 
 
 
Various tools and methods are used for RAMS analysis. Some of these tools and 
methods are here presented, for example (Tzanakakis, 2013), 
 
i. FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analysis), 
ii. FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis), 
iii. FTA (Fault Tree Analysis), 
iv. Failure Block Diagram Analysis, 
v. CCA (Cause - Consequence Analysis), 
vi. HAZOP (Hazardous Operability Analysis). 
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2.3.1 FMEA 
 
 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic tool for identifying: 
i. Effects or consequences of a potential product or process failure. 
ii. Methods to eliminate or reduce the chance of a failure occurring. 
A successful FMEA activity helps a team to identify potential failure modes 
based on past experience with similar products or processes, enabling the team to 
design those failures out of the system with the minimum of effort and resource 
expenditure, thereby reducing development time and costs. 
 
 
2.3.2 FMECA 
 
 
Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is an extension of FMEA 
by including a criticality analysis, which is used to chart the probability of failure 
modes against the severity of their consequences. The result highlights failure modes 
with relatively high probability and severity of consequences, allowing remedial 
effort to be directed where it will produce the greatest value. 
 
 
2.3.3 FTA 
 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a diagnostic tool used to predict the most likely failure 
in a system breakdown. This analysis method is mainly used in the field of safety 
engineering and reliability engineering to determine the probability of a safety 
accident or a particular system level (functional) failure. 
 
 
2.3.4 CCA 
 
 
Cause - Consequence Analysis (CCA) technique combines cause analysis and 
consequence analysis. The purpose of CCA is to identify chains of events that can 
result in undesirable consequences. With the probabilities of the various events in the 
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CCA diagram, the probabilities of the various consequences can be calculated, thus 
establishing the risk level of the system. 
 
 
2.3.5 Failure Block Diagram Analysis 
 
 
Failure Block Diagram Analysis is the analysis of a system based on the 
component reliabilities. It is a method of modeling how components and sub-system 
failures combine to cause system failure. Reliability block diagrams may be analysed 
to predict the availability of a system and determined the critical components from a 
reliability viewpoint. Figure 2.3 shows examples of reliability block diagrams 
models for reliability design and assessment. 
 
Figure 2.3:  Reliability Block Diagram Models (Mun Gyu Park 2013) 
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2.3.6 HAZOP 
 
 
A Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic examination 
of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate 
problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient 
operation. A HAZOP is a qualitative technique based on guidewords and is carried 
out by a multi-disciplinary team (HAZOP team) during a set of meetings, to assess 
the hazard potential that arise from deviation in design specifications and the 
consequential effects on the facilities as a whole. This technique is usually performed 
using a set of guidewords: NO / NOT, MORE / LESS OF, AS WELL AS, PART OF 
REVERSE, AND OTHER THAN.  
From these guidewords, scenarios that may result in a hazard or an 
operational problem are identified. Consider the possible flow problems in a process 
line, the guide word MORE OF will correspond to high flow rate, while that for 
LESS THAN, low flow rate. The consequences of the hazard and measures to reduce 
the frequency with which the hazard will occur are then discussed. This technique 
had gained wide acceptance in process industries as an effective tool for plant safety 
and operability improvements. Table 2.4 shows an example of the application of 
HAZOP for analysing the operational problems of train doors at platforms 
 
Table 2.4: An example of the application of HAZOP (From Mun 2013) 
 
Guideword Deviation  Cause  Effect 
No Doors fail to open Defective mechanism No passenger egress 
More 
Doors open to early 
(train moving or not 
adjacent to platform) 
Operator error 
Possible harm to 
passengers 
Less  Only one door open Defective mechanism 
Restricted passenger 
egress, may lead to 
crush injuries  
As well as 
Doors open on both 
sides of train 
Failure in control 
circuitry  
Possible harm to 
passengers if they exit 
the wrong door 
Part of Same as less - - 
Reverse  N/A N/A  
Other than Doors open wrong side 
Failure in control 
circuitry 
Possible harm to 
passengers if they exit 
the wrong door 
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2.4 Reliability Centre Maintenance 
 
 
Reliability-based maintenance (RCM) is analytical technique maintenance to identify 
and determine the failure management policies for the achievement of operational 
objectives such as safety, availability and cost. Failure management policies 
generally include maintenance strategy, operational changes, modification of design 
or other to control due to the mode of failure. RCM implementation steps are detailed 
along with the tools and techniques needed or improvements made to the 
effectiveness of the system (Melissa et al. 2014). 
RCM provides a structured logical decision process to determine the 
appropriate basic preventive maintenance, design improvements, or a suitable 
alternative for security, operational impact, and potential degradation mechanisms 
malfunction, the analysis is supported by FMECA, FTA and other. The application 
of RCM at the operation and maintenance stages can be applied for the improvement 
of the existing maintenance policy. Figure 2.4 shows a procedure that can be done 
with RCM FMECA in the design process systems engineering. RCM is usually 
implemented to monitor the results of the risk assessment with preventive 
maintenance strategies (Mun 2013). 
 
Figure 2.4:  RCM Model (Mun 2013) 
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2.5 RAMS in Operation and Maintenance 
 
 
The objective of this phase is to operate, maintain and support the combination of 
components and subsystems such that compliance with the requirements RAMS 
system is maintained. 
Figure 2.5 shows the process for RAMS track system in operation and 
maintenance phase in the life cycle of the system. It is a process of continuous 
improvement in all phases of operation and maintenance. 
 
Fig. 2.5: RAMS process in the operation and maintenance phase (Tzanakakis 2013) 
 
RAMS analysis should be done as early as possible in the design stage to 
ensure performance calculation is performed for the entire system, including all 
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existing subsystem and not only for one subsystem that can be affected by other 
subsystems. 
 
 
2.6 Literature review about Reliability and Maintainability of railway track. 
 
 
Train need maintenance to performed to keep the train operating (preventive 
maintenance), and they are repaired when they fail (corrective maintenance). The 
ease with which maintenance work (including repair) can be carried out determines 
train maintainability. Maintenance work can be divided in two categories, preventive 
and corrective (Klaus et al.1993). 
Preventive maintenance seeks to retain the system in an operational or 
available state by preventing failures from occurring. This can be by servicing, such 
as cleaning and lubrication or by inspection to find and verify incipient failures. 
Preventive maintenance affects reliability directly. It should be performed in a 
planned manner. Preventive maintenance can be measured by the time taken to 
perform the specified maintenance tasks and their specified frequency. 
Corrective maintenance includes all actions to return a system from a failed 
to an operating or available state. The amount of corrective action is, therefore, 
determined by reliability. Although a plan for corrective maintenance can be 
established, the timing and complete details of corrective maintenance action cannot 
be planned; it happens unexpectedly and should be avoided by design. 
System maintenance related to the actual maintenance work to develop 
maintenance procedures. Based on the failure modes, various tools and methods are 
used to calculate reliability and maintainability of the system are used FMEA 
(Failure Mode and Effects Analysis), FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis), FTA (Fault Tree Analysis), Failure Block Diagram Analysis, CCA (Cause 
Consequence Analysis) and etc. (Kumar et al. 2001). Failure modes directly affect 
reliability based on probability of occurrence of failure modes, maintainability is 
related the number of failures occurring in a period of time of the system. 
Ambika stated, the available of the track barely consider the train Schedule. 
The availability of the track is necessary to consider demand availability in 
operational availability. Availability request is the probability that a system will be in 
a condition that works on demand. In the case of the track, the availability request 
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defines the long unit provided track when a train passes over it. To achieve the 
demand availability of the track section following measures must be considered; 
 
i. Reduce the corrective maintenance on the track.  
ii. All the preventive maintenance on the track must be carried out in the train 
free periods.  
Maintenance plans on the track need to utilise when the train not operation in 
order to maximum maintenance actions. In order to calculate the availability of a 
track section within period the reliability and maintainability of the track along time 
instead of train time table need to be considered. 
 
 
2.7 Literature review about railway signaling system 
 
The purpose of the signaling system is to ensure that trains keep a safe distance 
between each other. Based on previous research, the railway signaling system has a 
method to control the train operation to ensure safety of railway Transport. This 
signal system it depends on train authorities and it must be appropriate to the tracks 
used, train density and train schedule. Based on that for careful signaling system 
design must be concerned to ensure the availability and safety of train operations. In 
addition, to manage the rail it should take into account several factors, namely the 
amount of transportation and the layout of the track at the station (Shigeto et al. 
2008)  
Signaling systems based on information technology will be introduced more 
active in the future. Therefore, a systematic method for evaluating the signal system 
will become more important in the development phase. For safety, various 
technologies have been developed and used, and signaling systems have an excellent 
safety record. They are also responsible for assigning and provide use of the track, 
control the direction of the train, all the traffic order within the limits of 
infrastructure and establish timetables and regulations to ensure that the train is 
operating safely and efficiently.  
In the previous research of signaling system, through the definition expresses 
a performance of each equipment, the relationship between equipment failures and 
their impact on railway traffic service is not clear. Therefore, the author state a 
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method to evaluate system availability based on the following concepts of estimating 
the impact on train operation caused by an equipment failure (a component of 
signaling system) (Shigeto et al. 2008). 
The basic procedure is illustrated in Fig.2.6. Take into account the signaling 
system at a single station. When the equipment (eg, signals, track circuits, machines 
and interlocking devices) fail, there are various types of impacts. In some cases, the 
train cannot operate, while in other cases the train can run through the station via an 
alternative route. 
 
Fig. 2.6: basic evaluation procedure (Shigeto et al. 2008). 
 
The number of the train does not operate during failure and each equipment 
failure estimated based on the conditions specified. The failure is one of the 
conditions, and corresponds to the indication of maintainability. The loss of fare 
revenue caused by failure is estimated from the difference between the total actual 
planned and operated railway. The outline must be estimating loss each case shown 
in Fig. 2.7. 
 
Fig. 2.7: outline of estimating the loss (Shigeto et al. 2008). 
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2.8 Summary 
 
 
This chapter presents the overall concepts, methods and techniques of RAMS to 
identify the method suitable to use for train operation. This chapter has firstly 
reviewed the train operation of intercity train and freight service. Several concepts 
had to be study in RAMS engineering to establish the engineering concepts for this 
project. The activities of train operation have been reviewed in RAMS parameter to 
help the thorough understanding for establish of RAMS. In this chapter also were 
explain the RAMS tool can be used to determine in the train operation in order to 
solved it based on RAMS concept. Some literature related to this project has been 
reviewed, but the literature review will be continued during the entire project period 
of time in order to improve the developed research models. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Project Planning 
 
 
This chapter outlines the methodology designed to perform the project effectively 
and efficiently. This project established a strong foundation through investigation, 
comprehension and analysis of various literatures. The literature review should be 
implemented throughout the whole project to obtain the source of knowledge of the 
research topic and to continuously improved and updated to help the researcher to 
obtain the quality of the results. 
 This chapter also explains the processes employed specifically to guide the 
research work from beginning till end. The justification of every stage on how this 
research was conducted will also be included here. Interview surveys and case study 
were the methods conducted to get more information about railway operations 
between Ipoh and KL Central. MYRA, KTM Depot, Ipoh Station and the 
headquarters were among the places that were contacted. 
Planning of developing the overall project started from the selection of topic 
of the project. The discussion on the project title was carried out together with the 
supervisor to make sure it satisfied the field of project. Generally, the overall 
planning can be separated into two stages. The first stage is preparing the proposal of 
the project which consists of the title, the objective, the scope, the problem statement, 
the literature review and the methodology of the project. The second stage of the 
project is to come out with the analysis and the result of the study. GANTT CHART 
is a visual overview of the overall planning of a certain project. Therefore, a GANTT 
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